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Cooperation is one of the behavioral traits that define human beings, however we are still trying to understand
why humans cooperate. Behavioral experiments have been largely conducted to shed light into the mechanisms
behind cooperation – and other behavioral traits. However, most of these experiments have been conducted
in laboratories with highly controlled experimental protocols but with limitations in terms of subject pool or
decisions’ context, which limits the reproducibility and the generalization of the results obtained. In an attempt
to overcome these limitations, some experimental approaches have moved human behavior experimentation
from laboratories to public spaces, where behaviors occur naturally, and have opened the participation to the
general public within the citizen science framework. Given the open nature of these environments, it is critical
to establish the appropriate data collection protocols to maintain the same data quality that one can obtain in
the laboratories. In this article we introduce Citizen Social Lab, a software platform designed to be used in the
wild using citizen science practices. The platform allows researchers to collect data in a more realistic context
while maintaining the scientific rigour, and it is structured in a modular and scalable way so it can also be
easily adapted for online or brick-and-mortar experimental laboratories. Following citizen science guidelines,
the platform is designed to motivate a more general population into participation, but also to promote engaging
and learning of the scientific research process. We also review the main results of the experiments performed
using the platform up to now, and the set of games that each experiment includes. Finally, we evaluate some
properties of the platform, such as the heterogeneity of the samples of the experiments and their satisfaction
level, and the technical parameters that demonstrate the robustness of the platform and the quality of the data
collected.
Introduction
Social dilemmas modeled as behavioral games are important tools to study the general principles of human behaviour and
to understand social interactions. Social dilemmas occur when individual interests conflict with other individual or collective
interests [1–3]. Behavioural experimentation thus yield relevant scientific outcomes that have been used to test theories and to
refine models, providing experimental data for simulations [4], and making the understanding of human behaviour move forward.
But the impact of the experimental insights go beyond the scientific theories, because social dilemmas describe interactions and
conflicts in real-life situations such as climate change mitigation, refugee repatriation, use of public space, social inclusion,
gender discrimination, care-in community in mental health or resource depletion, and results obtained from behavioral research
can be translated to improve all these areas.
Traditionally, most experiments have been conducted in laboratories with highly controlled experimental protocols but with
limitations in terms of subject pool or decisions’ context [5–8]. There is a sample bias since a large number of laboratory
experiments’ sample consists of students who have a particular socioeconomic and sociodemographic situation. Thus, those
studies do not reflect the general population behavior [7, 9–11]. Besides, generalizability of results of laboratory experiments
also is affected by the physical context in which they are performed. The situations of social interaction that are studied do not
happen in laboratories, but in real life scenarios where participants face dilemmas and make decisions. This leads participants in
laboratories to not engage in real-world behaviors, but instead in behaviors that are biased by the experimental conditions.
Furthermore, recently social experimentation has been affected by the general crisis of science in replicability and repro-
ducibility, issues that concern the main actors in science [12–14]. Some efforts have been done to solve this situation, promoting
the transparency in the statistical and methodological aspects of laboratory work, but also promoting the publication of more
detailed methods, the data sources and the codes used in the experiments and in the analysis [15]. Scientists are encouraged to
conduct replication studies [16] and, in general, to pursue a more open research culture [13, 17].
In recent years, Computational Social Science has emerged as a multidisciplinary field that studies complex social systems
and provides new insights about social behaviour, combining tools and methods from social and computer sciences [18–21].
In this line, a large number of studies have been conducted generally exploiting big amounts of social data, mostly collected
from online social platforms (Twitter, Facebook, Coursera, etc.) [22]. Within the same field, some researchers have started to
∗jordi.duch@urv.cat
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
00
03
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  2
6 J
un
 20
18
2use online services such as Amazon Mechanical Turk as platforms to recruit and develop their behavioral experiments [23, 24].
Many experiments have been successfully deployed in these services providing new insights to social problems from another
perspective [25], however experiments on this platform also suffer from some known limitations [26]
Between the studies conducted with large-scale data from online platforms (that come from less controlled samples and
protocols) and the small-scale data collected from the experimentation in behavioural science labs (collected with more robust
protocols) there is a missing gap. New platforms fill this gap providing opportunities for the design of mid and large-scale
behavioral experiments in online labs that guarantee the quality of the data collection [27–29]. These more flexible platforms
have great advantages, as (1) they facilitate the recruitment of more diverse sociodemographic profiles or from very specific
communities according to the needs of the experiment, (2) they are able to carry out the experiments in a distributed way in
space and time, and (3) they are more efficient at the economic level, since the infrastructure is much lighter. In these platforms
other limitations arise, such as the identification of the experimental participants or the economic incentives, to mention only a
few.
Our scenario of experimentation is described in the context of pop-up experiments [30], an intermediate situation between
traditional behavioural experimentation and big data analysis. The basic idea is to translate the experiments outside the lab to
real contexts, and to open participation to new and more diverse audiences. More importantly, the experiments are not only build
by taking into account the researcher’s interests and motivations, but also considering the perspective of citizen participation and
its social impact in terms of providing the right knowledge to conduct new evidence-based policies by public administrations
and empower participants to trigger civic actions. This is framed within the citizen science approach [31–34], that promotes
the participation and inclusion of non-expert audience in real research processes in different ways [35, 36] (co-creating projects,
collecting data, interpreting and analyzing data, and provide actions based on the evidences collectively gathered). Citizen
science helps us to involve the general public in behavioural experimentation and impacts the participants themselves [36–40],
for instance increasing their disposition to science [41].
To carry out these experiments interactively, we designed and implemented Citizen Social Lab, a platform with a collection
of decision-making and behavioral games based on a light infrastructure that can be installed and executed in real-life contexts
in a simple but robust way. Depending on the goal of the experiment and the behavioral variables to be studied, the researcher
can select and parametrize one or various games, and also define the general dynamics of each experimental session. The plat-
form registers all the behavioural actions taken by the participants, but also provides surveys to collect sociodemographic data,
information about the participants’ experience or their decision making process. The platform does not allow the intervention of
uncontrolled participants, and it registers data accurately without alterations of any kind.
In contrast to other existing platforms, this platform has been designed to follow citizen science guidelines and to be used in
experimental settings where participants are recruited using opportunistic and random sampling. For these two reasons, both
the experimental staging and the platform include features to attract the attention of participants and, once they are enrolled, to
improve their focus and engagement within the experiment. In this line different approaches are used, one of them being the
gamification of the experience [42, 43], which consists in presenting the experiment as a game and a scientific investigation at
the same time. Another important feature is the feedback and knowledge obtained by the participants after the experience, for
instance through personalized reports for each participant or by organising public lectures that summarize the results once a
paper has been published. These efforts also add new dimensions to the mandatory open data access or ethical and transparency
requirements when dealing with citizen science approaches.
The experimentation platform has been active since 2013 and, within that time, it has been used successfully in 15 experi-
ments to study different aspects of human behavior. Up to this date 2821 people have contributed, taking around 45200 valid
decisions. We have developed it as an open-source project where software developers and the scientific community can help
grow the platform, but also to facilitate the reproducibility of the experiments and to foster the usage of platforms like these as
an alternative method to conduct behavioral experiments in all types of environments and settings.
The platform
Citizen Social Lab is a platform designed to assist in the deployment of human behavioural experiments. It has been created
with three important goals in mind that foster versatility. First, the platform is based on light and portable technologies, so it can
be used in open and diverse environments following the guidelines of popup experiments [30], but also in pure online or in more
“classical” experimental laboratories. Second, it has been designed with a friendly user interface to facilitate participation to a
broader population, and to engage and motivate participants to solve the tasks proposed in the experiment while they have an
enjoyable experience. And third, it is structured in a way that it is easy to incorporate any type of social dilemma or behavioural
game, as well as, any type of interaction: individual/computer, individual/individual and individual/collective.
The platform allows researchers to carry out a suite of dilemmas or behavioural games, which compose the core of the
system. The system already contains a few different available dilemmas, which are described in the next section, and this
number is expected to increase as new experiments are developed and deployed using the platform. Moreover, beyond the
data collected from the participant’s decisions, the system is designed to collect complementary data (about sociodemographics,
3Figure 1: Block diagram of a participant’s flow through one experimental setup. The participant goes through three stages: the first stage
contains the pre-game module with preliminary instructions about the experiment and surveys, the second stage contains the core game
mechanics (which implements the suite of decision-making and behavioural games), and the third stage consists of the post-game module with
the final feedback of the experiment and surveys about the experience and the topic of the experiment. Not all these modules and interfaces
are present in all the experimental setups.
user experience or experiment-related questions) through surveys before or/and after the social experiment takes place. It also
registers all the activity of the participants when using the platform, which can be used to infer other parameters (e.g. response
time).
The platform architecture is highly modular and allows the researcher to construct personalized environments combining and
parametrizing the modules they require for their particular experimental setting. The basic client modules currently available
are the following: (i) Introductory interfaces, with brief but detailed information about the topic and goals of the experiment and
legal information with privacy policy; (ii) Questionnaires; that can be used to collect sociodemographic information and also to
present specific questions related with the experiment topic or setting. Questionaries can be used before and/or after the main
experiment. (iii) Tutorial and instructions; so participants can learn the rules and the mechanics of the experiment by themselves
(even though in the physical location there are always researchers to provide support if any question arises) and practice a
few testing rounds of the game to familiarize themselves with the game interface. (iv) Games and/or dilemmas; the core of
the platform, the module that runs the experiment to collect the decisions of the participants. An experiment can incorporate
only one game or a collection of them. (v) Results; a set of interfaces designed to provide feedback to the participants on the
outcome of their decisions in the experiment. This is crucial to increase the positive return that they obtain for participating
in the experience. Finally, (vi) the administration interface is composed by a set of pages that let the researcher to control the
parameters of each session, monitor the evolution of a game, and overview the general performance during the experiment in
real-time.
The modules are combined and configured to define what we call the participant’s flow through the experiment (see Fig.1).
The system is designed to automatically guide the participants through all the stages without the need of interacting with a
researcher (unless otherwise required by the participant), and it allows the existence of simultaneous games at different stages
of the experiment.
Games Module
The main goal of the platform is to collect the decisions of the participants when they face different types of dilemmas that
are analogies of real-life situations. Most of the dilemmas included up to now are social, which require synchronized interaction
with other individuals, however the platform can also be used to study individual decision-making situations that do not require
4real-time interaction with other participants.
The first social dilemma implemented is a generalized version of a simple dyadic game, where two people have to decide
simultaneously which of the two actions they will select, and the outcome is the result of the combination of them. Depending
on the values presented to the participants, the can face different types of games: a Prisoner’s Dilemma [44, 45], a Stag Hunt
[46], a Hawk-Dove/Snowdrift [47–49] or a Harmony [50]. These dilemmas can be used to measure two important features of
social interaction, namely the temptation to free-ride and the risk associated with cooperation.
The second social dilemma, the trust game (TG), or otherwise called the investment game, is used in order to measure trust
and reciprocity in social interactions [51]. In TG two players are given a quantity of money. The first player send an amount of
money to the second player, the first player is informed that the money that he sends will be multiplied by a factor (e.g. three).
The second player takes the action of give some amount of the multiplied money back to the first player, and then both receive
their final outcome.
The third social dilemma, the Dictator game (DG) can be used to measure rationally self-interest or distribution fairness [52].
In this game, the first player “the dictator” splits an endowment between himself and the second player,“the recipient”. Whatever
amount the dictator offers to the second player is accepted, therefore the recipient is passive, cannot punish the dictator’s decision.
DG is not formally a game because the outcome only depends on the action of one player, in game theory those games are known
as a degenerated game. However, there are a modified version of DG which includes a third player who observes the decision
of the dictator and has the option to punish the dictator’s choice. The third person receives an endowment that could choose to
spend to punish the dictator, so that punishing has a cost for the punisher.
The fourth social dilemma, is a variant of the public goods game, which is a collective experiment game in which the players
with their contributions decide invest in public goods or keep their private goods. This particular version is known as collective-
risk dilemma [53, 54], and consists of a group of people who must reach a common goal by making contributions from an initial
endowment. If the goal is reached, every individual receives the part of the money not contributed. If not, a catastrophe occurs
with certain probability, and all participants lose all the money they had kept.
The platform also includes a decision-making game, where participants have to make decisions having uncertain and/or
incomplete information [55]. This game is played individually so there are no interactions with other players during the game.
With this game we can study decision making strategies by controlling the type and amount of information that can be accessed
by the participants.
All the dilemmas described previously can be parametrized to allow for different types of studies (for instance, controlling
the values of the payoff matrix) or extended to include different variations when they are available. Also, starting from the
implemented interaction structures (Fig.2), new dilemmas can also be constructed and added to the platform following a simple
set of guidelines described within the code of the platform.
Participation and Motivations
Moving the experiments out of the laboratories implies that usually the participants are not captive in advance, but instead
opens the opportunity to attract new audiences from a broader population. The recruiting process in open environments -
such as a games’ festival or public spaces- is substantially different from the recruitment in laboratories, and is usually based
on opportunistic sampling. This type of recruitment presents new challenges, since you have to attract the interest of the
population through other types of incentives. In the pop-up experimental framework [30] we usually include a narrative context
and performative elements to capture the attention of the participants. However, once the attention of potential participants has
been attracted, it is also even more important to present the experiment in a motivating way to guarantee their participation until
the end of the session.
We use gamification techniques to the degree that the experimental settings allow us to ensure the scientific rigour of the
experiments. Behavioral games and dilemmas per se already have elements and mechanisms of games such as: challenges,
objectives, rules, reward, punishment, interaction, competition, collaboration, call-to-action, among others. Based on them,
we create an experience where we present some of the experiments as games, with a narrative setting that creates a story
surrounding the experiment. In some experiments, mainly the ones that took place within the DAU Festival, an actor is in charge
of the recruitment characterized as the main character of the experiment (Mr. Banks or Dr. Brain, see Fig. S1 in the SI).
The experiments are designed to enhance the motivations of the participants, not only from the perspective of games, but
also to impact in the science disposition of participants, the understanding of science or the impact in social issues. This is the
particular case of the framed experiments: The Climate Game, Games for Mental Health, the games for social change within
the STEM4Youth project and the street art performance called urGentEstimar; all of them are focused on real social concerns: a
collective climate action, the mental heath promotion of in-community care services or the concerns from several school groups
related to social inclusion, use of public space and gender violence. Furthermore, beyond the economic incentive to participate
(according to their performance in the game), participants also receive feedback on how their decisions and contributions could
be translated into scientific research.
5In our case, there are two types of participation according to the experiment context. Most of the experiments have been
carried out in uncontrolled environments in terms of recruitment, without captive participants (e.g. festivals or public spaces).
In specific cases, where the experiments were carried out in collaboration with local communities, the need to apply special
recruitment techniques is not so important since the communities are usually involved in the design and the deployment of the
experiment. In any case, to support the game-based approach, the platform allows the introduction of resources to include the
narrative, always preserving the scientific rigour, and also provides features that can be used to create a gamified experience.
Technical Details
Figure 2: Interaction types included in the platform. The platform currently implements four different types of interaction that cover individual-
computer (a), individual-individual (b, c) and individual-collective (d) types of coordination. The numbers on the arrow indicate the order of
when each interaction takes place, black arrows are interactions from individuals to the computer, and red arrows are interactions from the
computer to the participants.
Some of the dilemmas previously explained require of individuals interacting in different manners. For instance, in games
where two individual participate there are at least two possible interaction styles: one where the two individuals make a simulta-
neous decision without knowing the other’s choice and after that they receive the outcome; or another where one player makes a
decision while the other player is waiting, once the first decides the second, knowing the other’s choice, makes her decision, fi-
nally both get their final feedback (see Fig. 2). Also, experiments can have different evolution mechanics: from one-shot games,
in which the players just make a unique decision, to iterated games in which the players make various decisions consecutively
with the same or different participants. And finally, we also have to consider the possibility that the interaction between the
players can be constrained by an underlying structure that defines the relationship between the players, which can range from a
all-connected-to-all structure to a specific network structure.
Taking all these points into consideration, we designed a client-server architecture that controls the flow of the experiment
according to the needs of the researchers. On one hand, the server manages the pace of the experiment, and implements all the
core games and synchronization methods between players. It is based on a python-django backend, combined with a database to
store the information generated separately by each experimental setup. The server can be run online, to allow experimentation
on the internet or it can be installed in a local server to run experiments in local area networks.
On the other hand, the client contains the user interface that the participants have to use to interact with the experiment.
The technology on the client side is composed of html and javascript files that are generated dynamically from the experiment
description files. The user interface has been designed to fit the resolution of a tablet device, but also works with any computer
with a standard browser. It is also structured in a way that can be easily translated to other languages.
Most of the experiments have used the same infrastructure consisting of a laptop that acted as a server and a collection of
tablets that allowed up to 30 participants to be simultaneously participating in the experiment. In Fig. 3 we present a diagram
of this infrastructure. Data is collected and stored in a database (which may be relational or not), and personal information is
stored separately from the experimental data to follow the privacy guidelines required by this type of experiments.
6Figure 3: Example of the platform infrastructure. This is the basic technological infrastructure used in the majority of experiments. It is
designed to be rapidly deployed in any environment.
Finally, live control of an experiment is critical to guarantee its correct development. For this reason, they can be controlled
using an administration webpage that provides two features: it allows the researcher to configure the parameters that will be used
in each iteration of the experiment (e.g. select if a certain group will be intervention or control) and it presents interfaces with the
status of the experiment. Live monitoring can be done at two different scales, at a particular game level, where researchers have
real-time detailed information about the evolution of a particular game (rounds played, decisions made, earnings, connection
status, ...), or from a more general point of view to obtain a summary of the status of the experiment (demographics, games
played, global earnings, ...).
The experiments
The platform has been in use since December 2013 in 6 different experimental setups focused on the analysis of human
behavior. Some of them have been repeated in different situations, which adds to a total of 15 experiments realized. In this
section we describe the main goals and results of the six research projects based on this platform, which are also summarized in
Table 1.
1. The first experimental setup based on the platform is “Mr. Banks: The Stock Market Game” to study how people make
decisions when they have limited and incomplete information. This setup emulated a stock market environment in which
people had to decide whether the market would rise or fall. It allowed us to study the emerging strategies and the relevant
use of information when making decisions under uncertainty, and the results are published in [55]. Three experiments
based on this setup have been done in different locations, and is now available online†.
2. Next, we created another experimental setup entitled “Dr. Brain” to study the existence of cooperation phenotypes. The
games played by the participants were based on a broad set of dyadic games and allowed us to deepen our understanding
of human cooperation and to discover five different types of actors according to their behaviours [56].
3. The following experimental setup included in the platform was “Dr. Brain: The Climate Game”, which was based on
a collective-risk dilemma experiment to study the effect of unequality when participants face a common challenge [57].
Results showed that even though the collective goal was always achieved regardless of the heterogeneity of the initial cap-
ital distribution, the effort distribution was highly inequitable. Specifically, participants with fewer resources contributed
significantly more (in relative terms) to the public goods than the richer - sometimes twice as much.
4. The fourth experimental setup implemented in the platform was called “Games for Metal Health” which was repeated in
4 different locations. The goal of this project was to evaluate the importance of communities for effective mental health
care by studying different behavioral traits of the different roles of the ecosystem. The results presented in [58] reinforce
the idea of community social capital, with caregivers and professionals playing a leading role.
5. In the context of the EU project STEM4Youth we performed three experiments, which were co-designed with high-schools
of Barcelona, Badalona and Viladecans. They addressed topics raised in workshops with students: gender inequalities,
†http://www.mr-banks.com
7Table 1: Summary of experiments performed thus far. The suit of games is formed by: Decision-Making Game (DM), Harmony Game
(HG), Snowdrift Game (SG), Stag-Hunt Game (SH), Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Trust Game (TG), Dictator’s Game (DG) and Collective-Risk
Dilemma (CRD). The number of participants and decisions are the valid ones.
Experiment Location Date Games Participants Decisions Publication Data
Mr. Banks:
The Stock Market Game
Barcelona Dec.2013
DM
283 18525
[55] [59]Brussels Jul.2015 37 2397
Barcelona Jun.2015 20 1078
Dr. Brain Barcelona Dec.2014 HG, SG, SH and PD 524 8366 [56] [60]
Dr. Brain
The Climate Game
Barcelona Dec.2015 CRD 320 3200 [57] (Embargoed)1
Barcelona Dec.2015 100 1000
Games for
Mental Health
Lleida Oct.2016
CRD, TG and PD
120 1680
[58] [61]Girona Mar.2017 60 840
Sabadell Mar.2017 48 672
Valls Mar.2017 42 588
STEM4Youth
Badalona Apr.2017 DG, TG and PD 151 1510
(In preparation) (Embargoed)1Barcelona Sep.2017 126 1260
Viladecans May.2017 CRD 162 1620
urGentEstimar Ta`rrega Sep.2017 DG, SG and PD 756 2314 (In preparation) (Embargoed)1
Barcelona Oct.2017 72 136
1 Embargoed until scientific publication.
use of public space and integration of immigrants. The experiments combined a set of games that included Trust Game,
Dictator’s Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Public Goods games.
6. Finally, we performed two experiments named “urGentEstimar” in the context of artistic performances in Ta`rrega and
Poblenou (a Barcelona neighborhood), in which the participants took part in a set of behavioural games which included
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Dictator’s Game or Snowdrift, and which were framed around different concerns of local communi-
ties.
Platform evaluation
In this section we analyze the versatility and the robustness of the platform by reviewing some of the results obtained by its
use in different experimental setups. Mainly we focus on the sociodemographic diversity, the experience of participation, the
time response data collected in the iterative experiments, and finally the robustness in the replicability of experiments.
Sociodemogaphic
To start, we review some of the demographical data of the participants in the different experiments. We already stated that
one of the main goals of the platform was to open the experiments to a more general population. In this direction, in Fig.4 we
present an overview of the 2821 people that took part at some point in the behavioural experiments and perform the experiment
with this plarform. We observe that we had a combination of participants from a wide range of ages, specially from 10 to 50, but
older too, and diverse educational levels, with a predominance of those with higher education. Gender is also balanced (45.73%
females) compared with other similar experiments which are usually performed by students with sociodemographic bias.
8Figure 4: Diversity of the participants pool. (Left) The proportion of participants in all the experiments (n=2821) regarding gender is 54.27%
males and 45.73% females. (Center) Distribution of participants according to their ages in all the experiments (n=2821). (Right) Educational
level of participants in all the experiments except “urGentEstimar”, which didn’t ask this question to participants (n=1993).
Response times
Figure 5: Time of response in different games. (Left) Time response evolution across rounds in Mr. Banks experiments for the main per-
formance in DAU (n=283) and the two replicas CAPS (n=37) and Sonar+D (n=20). (Right) Time response evolution across rounds in The
Climate Game experiment in both performances, DAU (n=320) and City (n=100)
The platform allows for the collection of very precise parameters about the participation in the experiments. One of them is
the timestamp in which the participants perform an action. In iterated experiments, where participants make several decisions
consecutively, the decision times are collected in each round so that we can calculate how long each participant takes to make a
decision. An interesting parameter in behavioral experimentation is the learning time, or in other words, the evolution of time
across the game.
In Fig.5 we can see the evolution of the decision-making time across rounds. On the one hand, Mr. Banks presents the
evolution of the three experiments that were carried out, the main one (DAU) and the two replicas (CAPS and Sonar+D). The
evolution of the time response during the three experiments shows very similar trends. In the first round the time is substantially
higher than the rest of the rounds and we see that from the 5th round the slope softens and stays more or less constant until the
end. In this experiment, the variables that come into play to make a decision are the same round after round, so the trend is
maintained during the game. The three experiments show similar trends but slightly different asymptotic values; the context,
size and heterogeneity of the sample may be the cause of this variation, which confirms the accuracy of the data collected.
On the other hand, in the case of The Climate Game the evolution of the game is somewhat different. The game starts with
long times that go down gradually; however, depending on the point of the game in which the participants are (i.e. the distance
to the goal) the times increase or decrease. In this case, unlike the previous one, the decision at each moment is given by the
distance to the final goal, so that, as they approach to the end of the game, the times increase again. Therefore, here we observe
two sets of behavior: the learning at the beginning of the game and the uncertainty as the participants reach the last rounds. The
trends of the two climate change experiments are similar, however, the absolute value of time is slightly higher in the “City”
context.
9Robustness of replicability
Figure 6: Robustness of generalization in Mental Health experiments. Levels of cooperation, cooperation expectation, trust and reciprocity in
the four experiments: Lleida (n=120), Girona (n=60), Sabadell (n=48) and Valls (n=42). It is represented the average level with 0.95 CI in
each case. The dashed line represents the total average levels. There are no significant variation in the level of cooperation (Kruskal-Wallis,
H= 2.38, p = 0.50), cooperation expectations (Kruskal-Wallis, H= 0.38, p = 0.94), trust (Kruskal-Wallis, H= 2.67, p= 0.45) and reciprocity (H=
3.02, p= 0.39). See Ref. [58] for further details.
We also measure the consistency and the robustness of the results across different repetitions of the same experiment. Some
of the six experimental settings described in the previous section were repeated in different environments and locations, in some
cases with similar populations (e.g. the mental health experiment) and in other cases with different populations (e.g. the Mr.
Banks experiment). We focus on Mental Health and Mr. Banks to examine the robustness on the platforms in order to collect
quality data allowing the replicability in different situations.
Mental Health’s experiments took place in Catalunya, in four different locations and social events (popular lunch, snack, etc.),
in sum participated around 270 people. We analize the differences between the four events in cooperation, expected cooperation
(Prisoner’s Dilemma) and, trust and reciprocity (Trust game). The differences among the experiments in the four locations are
not significative and the data can be aggregated to be analized as a whole 6.
Mr. Banks’ experiment was performed in a main location, the DAU Festival, with a large participation, 306 people (283
valid participants), and obtaining robust results. From the analysis of decision emerged two strategies Market-Imitation and
Stay-Win Switch-Lose. We compare the main result with two replicas that took place in two different events in Brussels (CAPS
conference) and Barcelona (Sonar+D) with data from a narrow demographic populations and with the number of samples much
lower than the main experiment. There are no significant differences (>1.96 SD) between the main experiment and the replicas
except in Market-Imitation Up/Up between DAU and SONAR+D and Lose-Switch strategy between DAU and CAPS as Fig.7
shows. This means that the platform captures data accurately since we are able to observe that the behavioural patterns found
are consistent with the main results, because part of the results arise significant differences and the rest do not depend on the
conditions.
Experience
Finally, another important aspect that we measured is the overall satisfaction of the participants after they finish the experiment.
In the post-game survey of three games (Mr. Banks, Dr. Brain and The Climate Game) we asked the participants their level of
satisfaction of the overall experience. Results of this question are presented in Fig.8. In all the experiments participants were
mostly very satisfied or satisfied after the experience, specifically 82.77%. The complete set of results about the experience in
each game is represented in the Table S3.
10
Figure 7: Stability of strategies in Mr. Banks replication experiments. Ratio to follow strategies of Market Imitation and Win-Stay Lose-Shift
in the experiments: DAU (n=283), CAPS (n=37) and Sonar+D (n=20). There are no significant differences in Market Imitation strategies
except the probability to Up/Up between the experiments of DAU and Sonar+D in (-2.53 SD). There are no significant differences in Win-Stay
except in the last case (Lose-Switch) between the experiments of DAU and CAPS (2.35 SD). See Table S1 and Table S2 for further details.
Figure 8: Participants experience. Experience of participation in Mr. Banks, Dr. Brain and The Climate Change (n=1178). The most of
participants (82.77%) had a positive experience and a small group (9.51%) had a negative experience, the rest (7.72%) has an indifferent
experience.
Discussion
With Citizen Social Lab we present a platform that combines human behavioral experiments with a citizen science approach
with the sake of bringing science to a broader audience and to perform social experiments beyond the laboratories. The platform
is designed to be versatile, easy-to-use and robust, and to be used in open and diverse environments. It has already been adopted
in several experiments by thousands of participants from a wide range of demographics, which mostly valued to experience to
be very positive. The results obtained by some of the 15 experiments realized with the platform have also shown the scientific
validity of the data obtained from the platform with several scientific contributions [55–58].
In order to maximize participation and make it much more diverse than usual social experiments, we move the laboratory to
the wild. In this non-friendly context we use the the pop-up experimental setup to draw the attention of the potential participants
(which are all the people of the surroundings) with different techniques described in Ref. [30]. Then, we benefit from the lure
of the game-base mechanics included in the platform in order to introduce them in the experience and guide them through all
the tasks required by the experimental setup. This approach has proved to be very particularly successful in environments where
they are likely to play (as the case of a games festival), leading to successful experiments with a high participation.
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In this line, it is important to emphasize the need to adapt the experiments to the environment where they take place (e.g.
musical festivals, scientific conferences, and so on), especially the experimental design and the interaction with the platform,
because it is the way to increase the empathy with potential participants. To achieve this, all the mechanisms of behavioral
games and social dilemmas can be used to convert the interaction with the platform into a game (or other mechanism that fits
in the context), always with the constraints imposed by the experimental scientific rigor. It is also important to remark that the
interface of the platform has to be friendly and adapted to the latest usability standards to overcome the “technological barrier”
that might appear for certain groups of ages or social backgrounds. For instance, in the experiments where kids are involved
(which have been approved and designed accordingly), a friendly and visual appealing interface based on tablets provides an
extra motivation to attract them to participate and reduces the time they need to learn the basics of the experiment.
After all the experiments and their repetitions we consider that the platform has already reached a high maturity level, but there
are several points that still need some work to keep improving the technical and experimental parts. First, the platform has been
largely tested within the pop-up experimental setting in physical environments. However, even when it has been designed to be
easily integrated with online recruiting systems (e.g. Amazon Mechanical Turk), it has not been properly tested and validated in
these environments. There is an opportunity to repeat some of the experiments to extend the consistency of the results when the
dilemmas are presented to a purely online community.
Moreover, the platform is also constantly improving to provide new features and social dilemmas for the researchers. For
example, we are creating the capacity for participants to create a unique profile and join in different environments. The long-
term goal is to create a community of volunteers that participate in the experiments, and that can receive alerts when new
opportunities to participate are open. We are also extending the number of available dilemmas within the platform as new
research projects emerge which, once programmed and tested, are included in the main collection of available dilemmas.
The conceptual design in both types of experiments, the pop-up ones that have been done so far and the large-scale ones
that are planned in the future, have in common that the motivations of participants and scientific rigor are at the center of the
participatory design. The platform has room for improvement in motivating the participants and in offering rewards at the level
of learning and participation. On one hand, it is necessary to improve the mechanisms of learning about the scientific topic of
experimentation during the participation in the experiment, but also about the nature of their contributions and about the positive
impact in carrying scientific knowledge forward. In this sense, many experiments are framed within a context of social impact,
so participation can also be associated to a call to action to solve social concerns. In the most recent experiments, this type of
actions have been carried out outside the context of the platform, however, the online version can also contribute to this mission.
On the other hand, participants can improve their experience at the end of the experiment, not only receiving the necessary
economic incentive but also obtaining an on-site feedback expanded with real-time information about the research process in
which they have participated. They can also obtain an improved experience by remotely following the evolution of the scientific
research and participating in more phases of the scientific process. Another possible avenue to improve the platform is to
build effective and real-time tools attached to experiments. Participants could in this way provide more feedback and actively
contribute in the data interpretation and knowledge building process in both individual and aggregated levels. This effort appears
to be meaningful to increase the participants’ sense of ownership of the knowledge being produced by means of citizen science
strategies.
Finally yet importantly, all the experiments done within these platform have been following open principles: the articles have
been published as open access, and the data generated in all the experiments is also available in public repositories (properly
anonymized) [59–61]. In the same vein, we are releasing the source code of Citizen Social Lab, including the core of the platform
and the code of all the experiments done up-to-date, to the researcher community so they can use it to create their experiments
using the templates and guidelines already established in the platform. The project code is going to be released under a CC
BY-NC-SA license. In the very end, if we aim to practice citizen science, it is also necessary to claim for opening the platform
by all means: releasing data and code and opening up the results to make them accessible and understandable for anyone.
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Appendix A: Supplementary Notes
Platform screenshots
In this section we present some screenshots of the different experiments that have been deployed within the platform. First,
in Fig. S9 we present the initial screenshots of three of the experiments, Mr. Banks, Dr. Brain and The Climate Game. In these
screens we observe the characters designed as part of the experimental setup to create a narrative and attract the attention of the
public to the experiment. In Fig. S10 we show the user interface of these three experiments. In all the cases the interface uses a
simplistic but visually appealing approach to present the dilemmas to the participants. Additionally, in all the experiments there
is a tutorial where the participants learn the mechanics of the game and the user interface, we can see some of the screens of the
tutorial of The Climate Game experiment in Fig.S11.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure S9: Screenshots of the initial screen of three experiments (a) Mr. Banks, (b) Dr. Brain and (c) The Climate Game. In this screen we
introduce a character and a narrative to attract the attention of the public and to motivate them to participate.
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(a) (b)
(c)
Figure S10: Screenshots of the main user interface of three experiments (a) Mr. Banks, (b) Dr. Brain and (c) The Climate Game where the
participants respond to the dilemmas.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure S11: Screenshots of the tutorial shown before The Climate Game experiment where the participants learn the game mechanics and
familiarize with the user interface.
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Appendix B: Supplementary Tables
Table S2: Market imitation. Biases with respect to the market (Participant/Market)
Experiment Up/Up Up/Down Down/Up Down/Down
DAU 0.71 0.29 0.47 0.53
CAPS 0.71 0.29 0.49 0.51
Sonar+D 0.78? 0.22 0.46 0.54
? There are significant differences (-2.53 SD) between DAU and Sonar+D experiments
(Binomial process differences test).
Table S3: Win-Stay Lose-Shift strategy. Decision conditioned to performance (Strategy/Decision)
Experiment Win/Stay Win/Shift Lose/Stay Lose/Shift
DAU 0.68 0.32 0.42 0.58
CAPS 0.71 0.29 0.48 0.52?
Sonar+D 0.72 0.28 0.40 0.60
? There are significant differences (2.35 SD) between DAU and CAPS experiments
(Binomial process differences test).
Table S4: Satisfaction of participants in Mr.Banks (n=234), Dr.Brain (n=524) and The Climate Game (n=420).
Experiment Very Positive Positive Neutral Negative Very Negative
Mr.Banks - 125 91 18 -
Dr.Brain 245 217 - 49 13
The Climate Change 204 184 - 25 7
